Under Review

• Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (With Coughlan and Gates), Conditional Accept at Games and Economic Behavior

Recent Publications

• Once Bitten, Twice Shy: The Negative Spilled-over Effect of Seeing and Experiencing Betrayal on Trust (with Chou and Hsu),  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied (best paper finalist at the Academy of Management)
• Expectations of Reciprocity when Competitors Share Information: Experimental Evidence (with Ganglmair and Holcomb), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• One Size Does Not Fit All: Personalized Incentives in Military Compensation (with Coughlan and Gates), Defense & Security Analysis
• Dissociable Contribution of Prefrontal and Striatal Dopaminergic Genes to Learning in Economic Games (with Set, et al.), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA)

Selected Working Papers

• Improving Coordination and Cooperation Through Competition
• Computational Testbeds for Coordination Games (With Romero)
• Ambiguity Aversion in Asset Markets: Experimental Study of Home Bias
• Comparative Statics of the Minimum-Effort Coordination Game (With Romero)
• Simulating the Cost-Effectiveness of Non-Monetary Incentives (With Coughlan and Gates)
• A Test of the Economic Theory of Enforcement: Observed Choices of Red Light Running Behavior. (With Eger), R&R at Crime & Delinquency
• Performance Based Incentives for Military Recruiters: Evidence from the U.S. Navy (With Arkes and Cunha)

Selected Work-in-Progress

• Executive Assignments and Bargaining
• Quality Adjusted Auction Mechanism: Market Design for Military Retention
• Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism: Experimental Results (With Coughlan and Gates)
• Competition and Public Goods of the Ultimatum Game (with Collins)
• Retirement Reform for the DoD
• Reverse Auction Experiment with Common and Private Cost